We use store-level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at ve multistore supermarket chains. We show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process, requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources. The menu costs average $105,887/year per store, comprising 0.70 percent of revenues, 35.2 percent of net margins, and $0.52/price change. These menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes. Speci cally, (1) a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs (due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item) changes prices two and one-half times less frequently than the other four chains; (2) within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The costs of changing nominal prices, also known as "menu costs," have important macroeconomic implications. First, menu costs can be a source of price rigidity, and thus can provide a micro-based explanation for monetary nonneutrality. Second, even small menu costs may be suf cient to generate substantial aggregate nominal rigidity and large business cycles.
1 Consequently, menu costs have received considerable attention in the theoretical macroeconomics literature as many predictions generated by traditional Keynesian and more recent new Keynesian models crucially depend on the existence of some form of price rigidity. 2 Despite the theoretical importance of menu costs, however, little is known about their actual magnitude, as the above quotation from Blinder succinctly re ects. Because of the practical difculty of measuring menu costs directly, a common feature of the existing empirical studies of menu costs is that they all provide indirect evidence.
price law average $105,887 annually per store. In relative terms, these menu costs comprise 0.70 percent of revenues, 35.2 percent of net margins, and $0.52 per price change, on average.
Our second major contribution in this paper is providing evidence that these menu costs can form a barrier to price change activity at these chains, offering direct support for the relationship between menu costs and store-level individual price rigidity. We present three types of evidence that these menu costs form a barrier to price change activity at these rms. First, we contrast the price change activity of a chain that operates in a state with an item pricing law with the rst four chains that operate in states not subject to such laws. Item pricing laws require that a separate price tag be placed on each individual item sold (in addition to the shelf price tag). We show that the average menu cost per price change for the chain subject to the item pricing law is $1.33, over two and a half times the corresponding gure for the other four chains ($0.52). These larger menu costs lead to very different levels of price change activity by these chains. Specifically, the four supermarket chains that are not subject to item pricing laws on average change prices on 15.6 percent of the products they carry each week. In contrast, the chain that is subject to the item pricing law (and therefore faces higher menu costs), changes prices on only 6.3 percent of the products it carries, which is less than half the average of the other four chains.
Second, within the chain facing the item pricing law, there are 400 products that are exempt from this law and thereby face lower menu costs. For these products the chain each week changes the prices of 21 percent of the products on average, which is over three times more frequently than for products subject to the item pricing law. Third, we provide evidence from the supermarket chains that the menu costs they incur form a barrier to certain cost-based price adjustments. Speci cally, we show that the chains not subject to item pricing laws each week experience cost increases on about 800-1000 products they sell. Yet, they adjust prices of only about 70-80 percent of these products. The remaining 20-30 percent of the prices are not adjusted immediately because the existing menu costs make the necessary price adjustment unpro table. Considering all three of these ndings together, we conclude that menu costs can indeed affect price change activity at the level of the individual rm-offering direct evidence that these menu costs are relevant to marginal price change decisions. Finally, on a related macroeconomic issue we provide empirical evidence which suggests that the price change process in these supermarket chains has a strong timedependent element.
Relating our ndings to the existing theoretical models, we conclude that the magnitude of the menu costs we nd is large enough to be capable of having macroeconomic signi cance. First, recall that according to the studies of Akerlof and Yellen [1985] , Mankiw [1985] , Parkin [1986] , and Caplin and Leahy [1997] even small menu costs can be relevant since they may be suf cient to generate substantial aggregate nominal rigidity and thus large business cycles. Second, when considered in the context of the theoretical menu cost models of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] and Ball and Romer [1990] , we nd that the menu cost gures we report are "nontrivial" and their relative magnitudes cross the minimum theoretical threshold needed to form a barrier to price adjustments.
Although in this paper we provide direct measurements of the marginal costs associated with changing prices, it should be mentioned that there are still many aspects of menu costs we are unable to measure. In particular, we do not provide measurements of the marginal bene ts associated with changing prices, which can be signi cant [Lieberman and Zilberfarb 1985; Sheshinski and Weiss 1977] . At the local level this industry is extremely competitive [Calatone et al. 1989; Progressive Grocer, November 1992, p. 50; Chevalier 1995] . In such a competitive industry the bene ts of frequently changing prices can be high, as unmatched price cuts or consumer perceptions of higher prices can lead to signi cant losses in sales. 5 This helps explain why, despite the magnitude of the menu costs we found, we still observe frequent weekly price change activity by the chains we study. For example, stores change an average of 15-16 percent of their prices each week. Also, they seem to adjust the prices of 70-80 percent of the products for which they experience cost increases. 6 Thus, although we have evidence that the menu costs we report in this study clearly matter in the sense that they cre-5. Also, changing prices frequently can make it more dif cult for customers to compare prices of branded items across supermarkets because of higher search costs [Carlton 1986 ], which is valuable for creating differentiation between retail outlets [Bergen, Dutta, and Shugan 1996] .
6. This level of price change activity is similar to that found in other studies of U. S. supermarket prices [Dutta, Bergen, and Levy 1995] , although the price reaction to cost changes can be signi cantly more rigid depending on the nature of the cost changes the retailer faces [Levy, Dutta, and Bergen 1996]. ate some barriers to price change activity at these retail supermarket outlets, they are not large enough to prevent a signi cant share of prices to adjust.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the data. In Section III we discuss the price change process in supermarket chains and report absolute measures of menu costs. In Section IV we assess the effect of item pricing laws on menu costs. In Section V we discuss the signi cance of the menu costs. We end with conclusions and suggestions for future research.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
The data come from a company that sells electronic shelf label (ESL) systems. These systems allow retailers to change the shelf prices electronically from a central computer (where price changes are actually done) via a wireless communication system and thus reduce the physical costs and lead times currently associated with changing shelf prices. In order to sell the product, the company needed to validate what the existing costs of changing shelf prices were in supermarket chains, i.e., the existing levels of menu costs. This company received access from corporate headquarters at each of the ve chains in our sample to go to representative stores and carefully record the exact steps involved in the price change process. These studies considered the entire price change process in each chain. For this, detailed work-ow schematics of each task in the price change process was developed. Observations of the process were conducted in multiple stores of the chains (at least two representative stores for each chain) to verify its accuracy. Information received from chains' pricing systems, in-store observations, in-store counts, and in-store time measurements (with a stopwatch) were used to determine the volume of work performed in each step of the tasks, weekly frequency of each step performed, and the exact amount of time required to perform one unit of the work. After computing the total hours per task, this information was reconciled with the known total hours spent each week. This allowed for task level comparisons for the existing and test process. Each study required hundreds of man-hours to create. The studies were conducted during the years 1991-1992.
Although we believe the menu costs reported in this paper are representative of menu costs in the U. S. supermarket industry, we should mention that they may be biased upward because the rm had an incentive to overestimate the magnitude of the menu costs in order to sell the ESL system. We think, however, that the menu cost measures we report in this paper are not subject to signi cant biases of this sort for a number of reasons. First, the ESL people measured and documented all price change activities jointly with the supermarket employees using the wage gures provided by the supermarket management. Second, time and motion measurements of the type used for measuring the menu costs we report here are routinely done by supermarket chains themselves in order to assess the ef ciency of their price change processes. The supermarket managers compared their gures to the ESL company gures and found them to be similar. Further, these gures were presented to upper management of these chains and were found to be representative of their cost structures. In fact, the validity of the menu cost measures constructed by the ESL company was never disputed. If there was any disagreement between the ESL company and the supermarket chains, it was about the size of the savings the ESL system would provide, not about the accuracy of the menu cost measurements.
7 Further, we looked at these reports and searched for gures that could be biased upward. There were a few, such as loss of goodwill costs and inventory holding costs, and to be on the conservative side we did not include them in our measures of menu costs. Thus, we only report gures for which we could see no upward bias. Finally, note that the menu cost gures we report are clearly biased downward because we were unable to measure in dollar terms several components of menu costs and thus they are not included in our gures (see subsection III.5 for details). Table I displays some general information about the supermarket chains we study, their pricing strategy, and information about the frequency of weekly price changes the stores undertake. The chains involved in this study are all large U. S. supermarket chains, from different regions in the United States, ranging from the Northeast to the West Coast, and operating an average of 400 stores each. At the request of these retailers we will keep the companies in this study anonymous, but they are all large, multistore chains that seem reasonably representative of large supermarket chains currently selling in the United 7. Indeed, four out of the ve chains included in our sample have purchased ESL systems; three of the four actually purchased multiple systems (between two and twenty systems), and Chain E is considering buying 50 more. a. HL (High/Low) and EDLP (Every Day Low Price) refer to the general pricin g strategy followed by the retail chain. Under the EDLP strategy, the retailer 's prices are low for extended periods of time, and therefore it will offer fewer promotional sales or discounts. Under the HL pricing strategy, in contrast, the retailer's prices are higher, and the retailer tends to offer more frequent discounts through sales and promotions. See the text for more details.
b. The share of products for which prices change on an average week is the ratio of number of price changes per store per week to 25,000. The latter is the average number of products carried per store each week.
States. These chains are similar in the variety, selection, and quantity of the products they carry. Supermarket chains of this type make up $310,146,666,000 in total annual sales, which is 86.3 percent of total supermarket chain sales in 1992 [Supermarket Business 1993], so the chains in our sample are representative of a major class of the retail grocery trade.
According to the second row in Table I , the number of weekly price changes in Chains A-D ranges from 3223 to 4316 for an average of 3916 per store. 8 The variation in the number of weekly price changes across the chains is due in large part to their choice of pricing strategy: Chains A and B follow a high/low (HL) price strategy, while Chains C and D follow an everyday-low-price strategy (EDLP). Under the EDLP strategy the retailer's prices are low for an extended period of time, and therefore it will offer fewer promotional sales or discounts. Under the HL pricing strategy, in contrast, the retailer's prices are higher, and the retailer tends to offer more frequent discounts through sales and promotions. The pricing strategy, therefore, will have an effect on the frequency of price changes observed. In particular, we would ex-8. Since Chain E is subject to an item pricing law, it is discussed separately in Section IV.
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pect EDLP stores to have less frequent price changes in comparison to the HL stores. Indeed, according to Table I , Chains A and B tend to have a higher number of weekly price changes (4278 and 4316, respectively) than Chains C and D (3846 and 3223, respectively) .
Supermarkets of the size we study tend to carry around 25,000 different items on a regular basis. 9 The last row in the table presents the share of the 25,000 products for which the supermarket chains change their prices in a period of one week. The average share for the four chains is 15.66 percent.
III. ABSOLUTE MEASURES OF MENU COSTS
There are four components of menu costs that we are able to measure in dollar terms.
10 These are (1) the cost of labor required to change the shelf price tags, (2) the cost of printing and delivering new price tags, (3) the cost of mistakes made during the process of changing prices, and (4) the cost of in-store supervision time spent on implementing price changes.
III.1. Costs of the Labor Required to Change Shelf Prices
Figure I displays an overview of the steps involved in changing prices at Chain A. There are three main components in the labor costs incurred by the chains: (a) labor cost of tag change preparation, (b) labor cost of the tag change itself, and (c) labor cost of verifying whether the price changes are done correctly, which include tag change veri cation, in-store resolution of price mistakes, and zone and corporate resolution of price mistakes. 9. The supermarkets often have about 40,000 UPC codes in their computer database records, but internal studies undertaken by the ESL company indicate that the supermarkets usually carry no more than 25,000 products at any given time. The extra UPC codes are for seasonal or promotional sizes and packages of products, and for discontinued products.
10. In this paper we only report measures of the marginal cost of changing prices. The costs of putting a price tag for the rst time, and other costs that would be included in the average cost, are not included in the gures we report. Only when discussing Chain E, which is the chain subject to item pricing laws, did we face the issue of cost of pricing (at the rst time) versus the cost of changing a price. Since there was no clear way of separating the two types of costs, the reported cost gure ($44,168 , in the second paragraph of Section IV) was excluded altogether from our calculations. Also see footnote 13.
11. For a detailed description of the entire price change process with owcharts documenting the speci c steps undertaken in this process and the exact time period spent on each step, see Levy, Dutta, Bergen, and Venable [1997] . An appendix reporting computational details, are contained in a working paper version of this paper which is available upon request.
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FIGURE I
Overview of the Price Change Process POS denotes Point of Sale and refers to the cash register or the database it is connected to or both. For information on the various steps undertaken in each stage of the price change process and the amount of the labor time spent on most time-consuming steps, see Table II. Standard price tag changes, which include the steps outlined on the left-hand side of Figure I , make up the majority of price changes in these chains. Some price changes also require additional price signs to be placed at different locations in the store, such as on an end of aisle display or near the shelf.
12 These sign 12. These are usually related to the product being on promotion, feature advertising, display, or in-store sale such as "manager's special," "today's special," etc. The steps involved in making sign changes are similar to price changes. The main differences are that (i) the time required for each of the steps in sign changes THE MAGNITUDE OF MENU COSTS changes add to the menu costs, and they are outlined on the right-hand side of Figure I : the sign change preparation, actual sign changes, and sign change veri cation boxes. The bottom two boxes in Figure I are additional menu costs related to the extra steps taken in these stores to make sure the tag and sign changes have been done correctly.
13 Table II lists each stage of the price change process, the total amount of time spent on each stage each week on average, and the number of tasks performed. In addition, the table identi es some of the main tasks performed in each stage as well as the four most time-consuming tasks in each stage. To compute the total labor time used in changing prices on a weekly basis, we combine the data collected through in-store time and motion observations with information on the volume of products for which prices are changed. These weekly hours are multiplied by the wage rates (adjusted for fringe bene ts) of the employees used in the price change process to get the total costs of labor required to change prices.
For the four supermarket chains in our study, the total annual labor cost of changing the shelf price tags ranges from $40,027 to $61,414 per store, for an average of $52,084 (see the rst row in Table III , making up about 49 percent of the total menu costs on average. The labor cost of changing the price signs range from $16,411 to $27,955 per store, for an average of $22,183 (see the second row in Table III) , making up almost 21 percent of the menu costs on average. Thus, for the four supermarket chains the total annual menu costs associated with the labor required to change prices (shelf price tags and price signs, combined) range from $62,210 to $81,703 per store, for an annual average of $74,267. This is the single largest component of the menu costs we report in this study, making up about 70.1 percent of the total menu costs for these chains on average. This should not be surprising, given that the most signi cant portion of retail are longer because they are in less standard locations, and (ii) there are fewer sign changes than standard shelf price tag changes. 13. The menu cost measures we report do not include the cost of changing prices in cases where items are moved from shelf to shelf, or where shelf space is reallocated by increasing the shelf space for some products at the expense of others. However, they do include the cost of pricing new products when they are rst introduced. While this could bias the menu cost measures upward since it really captures the cost of pricing rather than the cost of changing price, the size of this bias is marginal due to the small number of new products. For example, according to ESL company executives, the number of new products introduced at these chains each week ranges from 20 to 100 approximately. In comparison to the number of products for which prices are changed each week (3223-4316), the bias is negligible. For a more detailed discussion of the price change process, see [Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable 1997] . a. The labor costs of sign changes were not reported for Chains B, C, and E, and so we use instead the average of Chains A and D. b. The mistake costs were not reported for Chain D, and so we use instead the average mistake costs of Chains A, B, and C. c. The in-store supervision costs were not reported for Chains C, D, and E, and so we use instead the average of Chains A and B.
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grocery operating expenses is labor costs [Hoch, Drèze, and Purk 1994 ].
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III.2. Costs of Printing and Delivering New Price Tags
There are direct costs associated with printing and delivering the price and sign tags. The order must be recorded and processed at the chain, sent to the printer, recorded and processed at the printer, printed, packaged, and then delivered to each store. The cost per tag is usually quite low, $0.017 per tag at Chain A, which includes stock costs of $0.0118 per tag, impression and data center operator costs of $0.0037 per tag, and mail room handling costs of $0.0010 per tag. There are, however, many price changes undertaken each week. In total, the costs of printing and delivering the price and sign tags range from $3,048 to $10,018, averaging $6,014, per store per year (see Table III ). These costs comprise less than 6 percent of the total menu costs we report.
III.3. Costs of Mistakes Made in the Process of Changing Prices
Despite the labor put into checking to make sure that the price changes are done correctly, there are still many price mistakes that are not caught until customers discover them throughout the week, and these mistakes impose costs on the chain. Clearly, the costs associated with these errors must be considered when deciding whether to change prices or not, and therefore are a relevant dimension of menu costs. These mistakes can occur so often that they were a feature of a Dateline segment on U. S. supermarket chains [NBC, April 1992] and an article in Money Magazine [April 1993] . Both the Money Magazine article and Goodstein [1994] report that on average 10 percent of the products they examined had price mistakes. A more recent study by the Federal Trade Commission [1996] reports a total error rate of about 5 percent.
The menu costs associated with these mistakes include lost 14. Our measure of labor cost may overstate the true costs of changing prices if supermarkets hoard labor to save hiring and ring costs. However, this is not likely to be the case for several reasons. First, the labor costs of changing prices we report are based on actual measurements of the minimum amount of time and labor required to accomplish the task rather than on the number of employees hired to change prices at the store. Second, the adjustment in the amount of labor is usually done through hours worked, which makes cost of hiring and ring less relevant. And third, the workers on the oor are routinely moved from task to task according to the need. These tasks include stocking, cleaning, price changing, customer service, etc. The workers employed by supermarket chains are always busy, and so the opportunity cost of changing price is not zero. Therefore, labor hoarding is not likely to be an important factor in our measurements.
cashier time to correct the errors, scan guarantee refunds, and inventory mistakes associated with incorrect price tags.
15 Lost cashier time is measured here in terms of wage payments. Scan guarantee refunds are additional price reductions beyond the error, or additional items given away for free because of the mistake. Finally, the inventory mistakes costs we report include only the cost of stockouts, which occur when shelf price is lower than intended.
The mistake costs were available at Chains A, C, and D, and they range from $19,135 to $20,692 for an average of $20,140 per store annually (see Table III ). These costs are the second largest component of menu costs in our study, comprising about 19 percent of the total.
III.4. Costs of In-Store Supervision Time Spent on Implementing Price Changes
Managers at the store level spend time overseeing, implementing, and troubleshooting the price change process. Only Chains A and B had a measure of the menu costs associated with this in-store supervision time, and both of these came from a selfreported number of hours spent on changing prices by the managers at these chains. The hours spent on changing prices were the same across the chains, approximately ve hours per week. Thus, the menu costs for in-store supervision time came to $4241 and $6692 per store annually for Chains A and B, respectively (see Table III ). These costs comprise less than 6 percent of the total menu costs we report in this paper. However, notice that these measures do not include the cost of the management time spent on price change decisions made at corporate headquarters, which is discussed next.
III.5. Components of Menu Costs We Are Unable to Measure in Dollar Terms
Our data set does not contain the exact dollar measures of some menu cost components. One such component is the cost of corporate management time spent on price change decisions. 16 In 15. Other likely costs of price mistakes that we do not consider explicitly because we are unable to measure them in dollar terms are legal problems (when the scanner price is higher than the shelf price), loss in customer goodwill, and decreased pro tability (when the scanner price is lower than the shelf price).
16. It has been suggested that the cost of managerial decisions is one of the most important components of menu cost. See, for example, Ball and Mankiw [1994] , Kashyap [1995] , and Meltzer [1995] . Since the ESL system was not de-
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the supermarket chains we study, prices are generally set at corporate headquarters in a weekly meeting where the manager in charge of setting prices looks at a variety of information including (a) any manufacturer wholesale price changes, promotions, and other related issues; (b) past sales for this product; and (c) competitors' prices. Based on this information and on discussions with other managers, the price-setting manager decides whether to change prices and, if so, by how much.
To estimate the magnitude of these managerial components of the menu costs, consider the following. In an average chain there is at least one executive of merchandising, who devotes most of his/her time to pricing decisions. In addition, there are up to three senior managers who would deal with pricing and to whom category managers report. There are also ten-to-twelve category managers who are responsible for setting prices on all the products within their category. An additional two-to-four people spend full time handling the implementation of price changes across retail outlets, coordinating the printing and delivery of price tags, and handling pricing problems in the system. Another ve-to-seven workers gather the data on competitors' prices and analyse both the competitors' data and the store's own scanner data to put it in a form useable by managers making pricing decisions. Thus, in total there are about 21-27 people working at the corporate headquarters on price change decisions. Assuming $150,000 as the average annual salary of the executive of merchandising and senior managers, $100,000 for category managers, and $50,000 for the rest, the chainwide managerial cost falls in the neighborhood of $2.3-$2.9 million a year, which seems a substantial amount. However, note that these pricing decision are made for the entire chain, and therefore, the costs per store are signi cantly less, especially for the larger chains. For example, using $2.9 million as the upper bound, the additional annual menu cost per store for Chains A-D, which on average operate about 400 stores each, averages about $7250, which is much lower than expected, and is due to the centralization of the price change decisions in the chains we study. 17 signed to save the costs of corporate headquarter managerial time spent on price change decisions, the ESL company did not measure this component of menu costs. The estimates reported in this section are based on the information received from the ESL company executives.
17. A decentralization of the price change process, say, by allowing the storelevel managers to make price change decisions, can change these gures tremendously. For example, consider the following thought experiment conducted using
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Our menu cost measures also do not include the cost of changing prices of direct store delivery (DSD) products. These products are almost completely handled by manufacturers, including stocking, monitoring inventories, and setting and changing prices. 18 We have data on the weekly frequency of price changes of DSD products in Chain E. In an average week there are 174 price changes of DSD products, which is about 10 percent of the supermarket's total weekly price changes. Using the cost of changing the price of a regular product, $1.33 (see Section IV for details), the annual cost of changing prices of the DSD products in this chain roughly equals $12,034.
19 Our menu cost measures do not include these gures since we do not have similar data for the other chains.
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III.6. Total Menu Costs
The total annual menu costs reported for each chain per store are listed in the last row of 19. The process of changing prices of DSD and of regular products is similar. But with DSD products there are additional costs of the time spent on driving to the store, parking, and setting up the price change process at each store. 20. Our measures of menu cost also do not incorporate the cost of informing consumers about price changes, which can take a variety of forms such as newspaper ads and inserts, TV and radio ads, in-store promotion signs, etc. Finally, we have no data on lost customer goodwill and damaged reputation caused by discrepancies between price tag and cash register [Okun 1981; Carlton and Perloff 1994; Haddock and McChesney 1994] .
21. The variation in the menu costs across the chains is mostly due to wage rate and labor-ef ciency variations. Also note that since the supermarket chains in our sample are similar in the size of their stores, carry similar sets of products, and follow similar processes of price change and price change decisions, it is reasonable to believe that the chains incur similar types of costs. Therefore, as noted underneath Table III , these menu cost measures are computed by replacing the unreported gures by the averages of the available values from the other chains.
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sures include only the components we could accurately measure in dollar terms, which are discussed in subsections III.1-III.4.
IV. ITEM PRICING LAWS AND MENU COSTS
In this section we provide evidence on the menu costs for an additional chain (Chain E), which unlike the other four chains, operates in a state with an item pricing law. The most important aspect of item pricing laws is that they require a price tag on each individual item sold, not just on the shelf, which is what the other four chains in our sample do. For example, the item pricing law in Connecticut requires that the grocers "shall mark or cause to be marked each consumer commodity which bears a Universal Product Code with its retail price."
22 From a menu cost perspective, the requirement of posting prices on every item (in addition to the shelf price tag) introduces additional costs in the process of changing prices.
Although most of the steps involved in changing prices are the same for both types of chains, stores that are subject to item pricing laws have to undertake additional steps to obey this law.
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The labor cost component of menu costs in Chain E totals $75,127 a year, of which $49,710 is the cost of the labor time spent on changing the prices of individual items, $3,234 is the cost of the labor time spent on shelf tag replacements, and $22,183 is the cost of the labor time spent on sign changes (see Table III) . 24 An additional $44,168 is spent annually putting prices on new items as they are brought to the shelves. Although we do not include this last gure in our menu cost measures because we do not have information on how much of it is due to price change activity and how much due to just pricing-these costs are clearly a direct consequence of the item pricing law. The printing and delivery cost of price tags and price signs are $7,644, and the mistake 23. These steps, which are in addition to the regular steps undertaken to replace price tags on the shelves, include (1) obtaining item price tags, (2) setting up workstations, (3) locating the product, (4) removing an item from the shelf, (5) removing old price tag, (6) setting marking gun, (7) applying new price tag, and (8) returning the item back to the shelf.
24. Since we do not have a measure of the cost of labor time spent on sign changes and the cost of in-store managerial supervision time for this chain, we use the average of the chains that report them (A and D). Note also that the hourly wage rate of $9.07 paid by Chain E is lower than the hourly wage of about $14.00-$20.00 paid by Chains A-D.
25. Further, note that the chains with smaller menu costs are likely to change their prices more frequently which suggests that the gures of the total annual menu costs understate the differences between Chain E and the other chains. Indeed, despite the large difference in the menu cost per price change, the total annual menu costs per store for Chain E ($109,036) are more comparable to those of Chains A-D ($105,887).
26. In calculations that follow, we use industry averages because (1) the chains did not share this proprietary information with us, and (2) we were required to keep the identity of these chains con dential, as some of these numbers are detailed enough to enable some readers to identify the chains under study.
costs are $20,799. These gures, along with the amount of $5,466 for the cost of in-store managerial supervision time, yield total annual menu costs of $109,036 per store.
Although the magnitude of the total annual menu costs seem similar to the other four chains, note that the average weekly frequency of price changes in Chain E is only 1578, which is only 40.3 (5 1578/3916) percent of the price changes made by the other four chains. Thus, the average menu cost per price change for Chain E is $1.33 (see Table IV , last row). In contrast, the corresponding gures for Chains A-D average $0.52. Hence, the menu costs per price change incurred by the supermarket chain facing item pricing laws are more than two and a half times the amount incurred by chains that are not subject to this law. 25 Overall, these ndings suggest that legal restrictions of the type of item pricing laws can have a signi cant impact on the menu costs incurred by sellers.
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MENU COSTS
The next natural question to ask is, how important are these costs? To address this question, we (1) provide several relative measures of the menu costs, (2) discuss the effect of the menu costs on supermarkets' price change activity, and (3) discuss macroeconomic implications by relating our ndings to the existing theoretical models of menu costs. In each case, we provide additional evidence to help assess the importance of these menu costs.
V.1. Relative Measures of the Menu Costs
In order to assess the relative magnitude of the menu costs reported in Section IV, we now present the menu cost gures relative to the average store-level revenues and net pro t margins.
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In addition, we present the menu cost gures per price change.
The annual average revenues of a large U. S. supermarket chain of the type and size included in our sample is $15,052,716 CHAIN (IN 1991 -1992 [Hoch, Drèze, and Purk 1994] . c. The annual gross margin is $3,763,179 per store on average, based on 25 percent of revenues [Hoch, Drèze, and Purk 1994; Supermarket Business 1993] . d. The annual net margin is $301,054 per store on average, based on 2 percent of revenues [Montgomery 1994 ]. e. MC per product carried is computed as a ratio MC to the average number of products carried per store (25,000). f. MC per item sold is computed as the ratio of MC/(revenue/average price per item sold). The average price per item sold is $1.70. See note a above for revenue information. Note the difference between number of products carried and number of items sold. As an example, a Tartar Control Crest, 8oz. would be considered a product carried and 300 units of them sold per year would be considered number of items sold. g. MC per price change is computed as (MC/52)/(number of price changes/week), where number of price changes/week is taken from Table I. per store. 27 According to the second row of Table IV , the ratio of menu costs to revenues for Chains A-D ranges between 0.61-0.76 percent averaging 0.70 percent. 28 We relate the size of these gures to the existing theoretical menu cost models in subsection V.3. Net pro t margin, which measures the revenues minus all costs, is approximately 1-3 percent of revenues for these chains [Montgomery 1994 ], so we use 2 percent as a working average. The reason for the low pro t rate in this industry is the intense competition [Calatone et al. 1989 ], especially at the regional level [Chevalier 1995] , which has been increasing since the early 1990s [Progressive Grocer, November 1992, p. 50] . It follows that the average store pro tability for these chains equals $301,054 per year. Therefore, the ratio of total menu cost to net margin for Chains A-D ranges between 30.4-37.9 percent for an average of 35.2 percent. Thus, the menu costs we report in this study represent a signi cant share of supermarkets' pro ts.
Another way to look at the menu cost gures we report is to express them relative to the frequency of price changes. In the last row of Table IV we present the menu cost gures per price change for each chain. As the table indicates, the cost of changing a price in Chains A-D ranges between $0.46-$0.68 for an average of $0.52. For Chain E the gure is substantially larger, $1.33 per price change. 29 These gures are lower than the estimated cost of 27. This is the average of two different estimates, $12,945,432 and $17,160,000. The source of the rst gure is internal record of a supermarket chain of the type and size studied here. The second gure comes from Supermarket Business [1993, p. 52] .
28. We also measured the menu costs in terms of controllable operating expenses (which are the portion of costs that the retailer has direct control over and therefore are often the costs that the retailer is most focused on managing), and gross margins (which measure the supermarket revenues minus direct cost of the products it sells). We nd that the menu costs comprise 3.13 percent of controllable operating expenses and 2.81 percent of gross margins at these chains, on average. Finally, if we measure the menu costs relative to the number of products carried per store (about 25,000), then we nd that the menu costs per product average $4.23 for Chains A-D. See Table IV and its footnotes for details. 29. We can also try to express the menu cost gures relative to the number of individual items sold by these chains each year. (Note the difference between number of products carried and number of items sold. As an example, a Tartar Control Crest, 8oz. would be considered a product carried and 300 units of them sold per year would be considered number of items sold.) Using $1.70 as the average price of all the products sold, we nd that the menu cost per item sold for the four chains is in the range of $0.0103-$0.0129 for an average of $0.0119 (see Table  IV , second to last row). To see the relative magnitude of these gures, note that according to Berkowitz, Kerin, and Rudelius [1986, p. 319] , the goal of the supermarket chains of the type we study, ". . . is to make 1 penny of pro t on each dollar of sales." Thus, menu cost per item sold, when adjusted for the average price,
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$2.00-$3.00 per price change reported by Slade [1996a] . There are several possible reasons for this: (1) our menu cost gures are based on actual measurements of the resources that go into the price change process, whereas she estimates menu costs econometrically as model coef cients using a mix of store-level price and aggregate cost data; (2) we cover 25,000 products that the supermarkets carry rather than a single product category; (3) our menu cost gures do not include all components of menu costs; and (4) there could be differences in wage rates that may be important given the signi cance of the labor cost component in menu costs.
V.2. The Effect of Menu Costs on the Price Change Activity of the Supermarkets
In this section we present evidence which suggests that these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price change activity. To begin with, consider the effect of the item pricing law on the price change activity of Chain E. The data on the weekly frequency of price changes in each chain are displayed in the last two rows of Table I . According to these gures, the average weekly frequency of price changes in Chain E is only 1578. Thus, on average, Chain E changes the prices of only 6.31 percent of its products each week. In contrast, the average weekly frequency of price changes at Chains A-D ranges from 3223 to 4316, for the four-chain average of 3916 price changes weekly. So, Chains A-D change prices on 12.89 to 17.26 percent of their products each week, yielding a four-chain average of 15.66 percent. Thus, Chain E, which faces the item pricing law, changes prices only about one-third times as frequently as do Chains A-D. 30 Moreover, within Chain E there are 400 products that are exempt from the item pricing law, and thereby face lower menu costs. We nd that there are an average of 83 weekly price changes for these products, yielding 21 percent of these products changing prices. So within Chain E they change prices over three times as frequently for products with lower menu costs than for roughly equals one-half of their target net pro t per item, which seems substantial.
30. However, note that our comparison of the two types of chains may not be completely ceteris paribus because these stores are located in different states and therefore there may be other chain-speci c factors (in addition to item pricing laws) that distinguish these stores. We do not have any speci c information on these differences. We do know, however, that the stores in these chains are similar in size and carry similar sets of products.
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the products with higher menu costs. Note that this nding is on the price change activity within the same chain offering almost a natural experiment on the impact of menu costs on the chain's pricing behavior. Hence, we provide evidence, both across chains as well as across products within a chain, that as the costs of changing price go up, the frequency of price changes goes down. Thus, the menu costs we nd are signi cant enough to affect the chain's price change practice.
We also have additional evidence from Chains A, B, and D about these menu costs being a barrier to certain price changes, and it is summarized in Table V . According to the Price Management Department of Chain A, the chain experiences cost increases on 860 products in an average week, to which it would like to react with a price increase. 31 However, on average, 22 percent of these price increases are not implemented immediately because the cost of changing prices for these products is too high to make it economically worthwhile. Figures of the same magnitude were reported by other chains. For example, Chain D experiences cost increases for 961 products in an average week. Out of these the chain adjusts prices of only 633 products. The remaining 34 percent of the prices are left unadjusted because of the menu costs. Similarly, Chain B nds it economically inefficient to adjust prices of 508, i.e., 30 percent, of its products each week because of menu costs. This provides additional evidence that the menu costs incurred by these chains are preventing price adjustments to some costs changes, leading to price rigidities of the products involved.
32 Note that, although we do not have similar data for Chain E, we would expect signi cantly lower numbers on this measure at that chain. These gures also suggest an upper bound on the bene t of complete price exibility under the current pricing practice of weekly price adjustments. However, if new technologies (e.g., ESL systems) and new pricing practices (e.g., a decentralization of the price change decisions) are 31. Our data contain information only on the frequency of cost increases. Although it is more than likely that the supermarkets are experiencing cost decreases as well, our data set contained no information on such decreases.
32. Menu costs may even be playing a role in the observed movement toward pricing strategies that rely on fewer price changes, such as EDLP [Blattberg and Neslin 1989; Lattin and Ortmeyer 1991; Marketing News, April 13, 1992, p. 8] . According to Progressive Grocer [November 1992, p. 50] , "A growing number of operators say they have switched from high-low pricing [to EDLP]. They cite the inef ciencies of making frequent price changes . . ." Similarly, Hoch, Drèze, and Purk [1994, p. 16] , state that EDLP lowers operating costs by lowering ". . . instore labor costs because of less frequent changeovers in special displays." Chains C and E did not report these data.
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adopted, allowing a fundamental change in the way the pricing mechanism is currently set, the managers could consider more frequent price change activity (e.g., multiple times each week) as menu costs go down.
In this paper we measure the menu costs at the chains' current level of price change activity. It may be worthwhile to speculate on the shape of the cost function relating menu costs to the frequency of price changes by assessing how these costs would change if the price change activity were to increase or to decrease. It seems likely that many of the costs we report in this paper will (approximately) change linearly with additional price changes within the current range of price changes the chains are undertaking (plus or minus, perhaps, a thousand per week). For example, the labor costs associated with changing a shelf price tag, costs of verifying price changes, and the costs of mistakes occurring during this process, all increase linearly with the frequency of price changes. This is because most of the timeconsuming steps involved in the price change process must be repeated each time an additional shelf price tag is changed (see Table II ). Further, we were unable to nd many tasks that generated signi cant returns to scale. It is unclear what cost savings are available if the price change activity drops substantially be-low the levels it is at now. Clearly, if price changes were near zero, or done less frequently than weekly (say monthly), there could be major differences in these costs.
What is less clear is how these costs would change at more extreme levels of price change activity. With less frequent price changes, the menu costs could probably be reduced signi cantly, although the cost of deciding what prices to set initially, and the cost of putting the initial shelf price tags would still remain as a lower bound of the menu cost. However, for achieving more price exibility by changing prices more frequently (i.e., multiple times each week), substantial changes must be undertaken. At present, the supermarket chains are set up to make the majority of their price changes on a weekly basis, with the appropriate systems in place to make this process most ef cient. For example, in order to save costs and to have higher quality price tags (e.g., with color, more details, greater clarity, glossy, etc.), the chains often send new price tag requests to a printing shop, which takes three days to print and deliver the labels to each store. Then, given the large number of price changes taking place, and the goals of minimizing customer disruptions and labor costs (such as overtime pay), and coordinating with advertised price promotions, the prices are changed in the store over a two-to-three-day period (see Table VI ). The combination of these schedule and built-in lags is acceptable under the current practice of changing prices weekly, but would have to be adjusted dramatically to allow for significantly more frequent price changes on a regular basis.
Perhaps even more imposing are the costs of changing the managerial costs associated with the current weekly system of price changes. The process of pricing at this organizational level is not a self-contained activity taking place in isolation from other operations of the supermarket management. Rather, it is a part of a larger system of business decisions and operations. The current process of operations (such as data collection and their analysis, management meetings, coordination of the decisions across functional areas, etc.) is set up to function on a weekly basis. 33 Further, these management, accounting, and logistics systems are currently built around a tremendous amount of in-33. For example, the data are analyzed and presented to managers on Monday and Tuesday, with meetings set for Thursday and Friday to make pricing decisions for the next week in coordination with all other business functions of the chain. formation to be analyzed for thousands of products. 34 Accommodating more frequent price changes on a regular basis would require a radical adjustment of many managerial substructures and units at both corporate and store levels, which could involve costly investment in restructuring and retraining the existing labor force as well as in new physical and human capital. Thus, the cost function relating the menu costs to the frequency of price changes would be approximately linear from zero to roughly about 5000 price changes per week. With higher frequency of price changes, under the current weekly pricing practice, the menu costs are likely to increase dramatically, perhaps by as much as ten-to-twenty times, according to the ESL executives. 34. For example, under the current system, a chainwide category manager operating at the corporate headquarters needs to study and assess numerous pieces of detailed information such as competitors' price and sale information from the last week, the past week's sales at the own chain, manufacturer/supplier promotions, wholesale price reductions, coop allowances, new product offerings, shelf space decisions, coordination with newspaper advertising, logistics at the warehouses as well as at each store, store differences in terms of customer characteristics, and competitive environments, product/shelf selection, and layout, etc.
35. If the supermarket chains indeed restructure the entire price change process and begin to change prices much more frequently (say two-to-three times a week) on a regular basis, then the shape of this cost function could change in an unpredictable way.
V.3. Relating Our Findings to the Existing Theoretical Models of Menu Costs
In order to assess the magnitude of these menu cost gures in the context of the existing theoretical menu cost literature, consider the following calculation experiments done within the framework of two theoretical menu cost models. Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] study a general equilibrium menu cost model with monopolistic competition and with unit elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real money balances. According to their calculations, menu costs of the magnitude of 0.08 percent of revenues, which they consider "very small," may be suf cient to prevent adjustment of prices. Ball and Romer [1990] conduct similar calculations in the framework of a model with imperfect competition and menu costs. They nd that for plausible markup and labor elasticity parameter values, menu costs needed to prevent price adjustment are 0.70 percent of revenues, which as they suggest, are nonnegligible. For smaller menu costs, e.g., 0.04 percent of the revenue, which Ball and Romer consider "trivial," implausibly large values of markup and labor elasticity parameters are needed to prevent price adjustment to monetary shocks.
According to the gures in Table IV , the reported menu cost to revenues ratio for Chains A-D averages 0.70 percent, ranging from 0.61 percent to 0.76 percent. These are signi cantly larger than the "trivial" 0.04 or 0.08 percent gures mentioned above, suggesting that the menu cost gures we nd here are nontrivial. Further, under the model and parameter values considered by Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] , the menu cost gures we nd are higher than the theoretical minimum needed to form a barrier to price adjustments. Under the model and parameter values considered by Ball and Romer [1990] , the reported menu cost/revenue ratio for all but one chain reaches or crosses the theoretical threshold of 0.70 needed to form a barrier to price adjustments. The existence of numerous unmeasured menu cost components discussed in subsection III.5 also raises the possibility that the actual menu costs incurred by these chains are signi cantly higher than that threshold. This suggests that the menu costs we report may be large enough to form a barrier to nominal price adjustments, when interpreted in the context of these models.
An issue of interest in this literature is time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing rules (see, for example, Caplin and Leahy [1991] ). The evidence from our data set on the timing of price changes suggests that the price change decisions in these supermarkets have a strong time-dependen t price-setting element. 36 For example, according to Table VI, the prices in Chain A are changed weekly according to the following schedule: the price changes of general merchandise that is advertised is done Saturday nights; grocery and produce prices are changed Sunday nights; the rest of the general merchandise prices are changed on Monday nights; and the prices of advertised grocery items are changed on Tuesday nights. Thus, as the gures in Table VI indicate, over 96 percent of the price changes are done during Sunday and Monday nights. However, this does not imply that statedependent pricing rules are unimportant. Even if price changes across product categories follow a prescheduled weekly time table, the prices of which products to change is likely to be a statedependent decision. For example, it could depend on changes in supply and demand conditions such as competitors' price change decisions. Indeed, Levy, Dutta, and Bergen [1996] use retail store-level orange juice price and cost data to demonstrate that the extent of price response to cost shocks, that is, the extent of price rigidity, may depend on the nature of supply shocks. 37 We do not want to overstate the usefulness of our data for directly addressing the issue of monetary nonneutrality. On one hand, authors such as Caplin and Spulber [1987] have demonstrated that under certain conditions individual price rigidity may not be suf cient for aggregate price rigidity, but unfortunately, our data do not speak directly to this issue. 38 On the other hand, authors such as Akerlof and Yellen [1985] , Mankiw [1985] , Parkin, [1986] , and Caplin and Leahy [1997] have shown that even 36. Danziger [1983] , Caballero [1989] , and Ball and Mankiw [1994] suggest that time-dependent price adjustment of the type documented here can be optimal if the cost of gathering information about the state exceeds the cost of making the price adjustment itself.
37. We also considered the possibility of convexities in the cost of changing prices. Our data do not suggest many convexities since the labor time spent in the price tag change process, the cost of printing and delivering price tags, and in-store supervision time do not change with the size of a price change. The only measurable component of menu costs that could be convex is the cost of mistakes made: the larger the price change, the higher the probability of a customer noticing the mistake, and the larger the amount required to be refunded as compensation. Among the unmeasured components of menu cost, the cost of corporate managerial time may increase with the size of a price change because larger price changes may require more serious consideration.
38. Also see Balke and Wynne [1996] and Bryan and Cecchetti [1996] . Since we do not have measures of how menu costs change over time, our data also have little to say about time variation in menu costs or about the relationship between menu costs and in ation, which during the period of the data collection (1991) (1992) averaged about 3 percent annually.
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small menu costs can be relevant since they may be suf cient to generate substantial aggregate nominal rigidity and thus large business cycles. Therefore, as Blinder [1994] , Kashyap [1995] , and Slade [1996a] emphasize, it is important to search for direct evidence that such costs are indeed present at the micro level. By directly identifying, documenting, and measuring the magnitude of menu costs at the store level, we are taking an important step in that direction.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our main contribution is that we provide direct microeconomic evidence on the actual magnitude of menu costs for four large U. S. retail supermarket chains. The annual menu costs per store at these chains average $105,887, comprising 0.70 percent of revenues, 35.2 percent of net pro t margins, and $0.52 per price change, on average.
Further, we provide evidence which suggests that these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes. Specifically, we show that (1) supermarket chains not subject to item pricing law change prices two and a half times more frequently than the chain that is subject to the law; (2) within the chain that is subject to the item pricing law, they change prices over three times as frequently for products that are exempt from this law than for the products which are subject to this law; and (3) we nd that these chains do not adjust prices of up to one-third of the products for which they face cost increases because of menu cost considerations.
When we relate these ndings to the existing theoretical models of menu costs, we conclude that the magnitude of menu costs we nd is large enough to be capable of having macroeconomic signi cance. Speci cally, when considered in the context of the theoretical menu cost models of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] and Ball and Romer [1990] , we nd that the menu cost gures we report are "nontrivial" and their relative magnitudes cross the minimum theoretical threshold needed to form a barrier to price adjustments.
Despite the high relative magnitude of the marginal cost of changing price that we found, the data still indicate frequent weekly price changes. This is because of the high marginal benet of changing price, which is due to the erce competition found in the retail supermarket industry. That marginal bene ts may outweigh the marginal costs of changing prices in this industry, however, does not rule out the possibility that menu costs of the magnitude we nd here can create substantial nominal rigidity in other industries or markets. In less competitive industries and markets, menu costs of the type and magnitude we document here are likely to have a bigger impact on the frequency of price adjustment and, consequently, on the degree of price rigidity.
At a minimum the direct dollar measures of menu costs we report here can be used as a starting point for future research on measuring their magnitude in other industries and establishments. We anticipate that these menu costs will be similar in other markets which rely on posted prices (such as drugstores, department stores, etc.) because the steps involved in the price change process are likely to be similar. What may differ are the frequency of price changes and the labor wage rates at these stores. For example, since supermarket chains change thousands of prices each week, the total annual menu costs incurred by these chains per store are likely to be high in comparison to other retail formats such as chain drugstores or department stores. There are, however, a variety of industries for which the steps involved in changing prices would be signi cantly different from those reported in our study. For example, business-to-business sales which often rely on a sales force, will require changes in the list price sheets, changes in the instructions to the sales force which may include education and discussion with the salespeople in the company, and so forth. These business-to-business prices also often have more complex pricing schemes including quantity discounts, bundling, and individually negotiated prices. As another example, the composition of the cost of changing the newsstand prices of magazines [Cecchetti 1986 ] or the prices of products sold through catalogs [Kashyap 1995] are different from many of the menu cost components we discuss here. Further, the nding that a centralization of pricing decisions makes the storelevel managerial component of menu cost relatively small, suggests that the managerial menu costs likely are highest in settings where price change decisions are decentralized. Thus, future empirical work should look at menu cost and its composition in a variety of other industries, markets, and products, with both centralized as well as decentralized price change decisions, in order to see whether the magnitude of these costs can be generalized and benchmarks can be established. Further, there are technological changes taking place in this and other industries that promise to alter the structure of menu costs, which deserve attention. At the theoretical level our ndings suggest that it may be worthwhile to explore models which incorporate the idea of item pricing laws as an additional component of menu costs. 
